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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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INDIA-PAKISTAN: Indian preparations to recognize Bangla Desh are on the increase, but New Delhi may have some hope that Islamabad can be pressured to negotiate a settlement of its differences with East Pakistan.

On 9 September a Calcutta daily featured an interview with Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul, quoting him as saying that India would recognize Bangla Desh "very soon." Kaul reportedly made it clear that India planned to make strong representations on the Bangla Desh issue at the United Nations.

The Indians have also apparently played a guiding role in the formation of a multiparty Bangla Desh "National Liberation Front." The Front includes--among others--pro-Moscow Communists, who knowledgeable sources believe were brought in at Soviet insistence, and moderate Bengali Awami League leaders. It broadens the base of the Bengali freedom movement, and several members of the Awami League expect the Front to become the forerunner of a "war council."


Despite these moves, the Indians are still proceeding slowly and they may be attempting to pressure Islamabad into negotiations with the Bengali leaders. In a New Delhi press conference on 10 September, Bangla Desh Foreign Secretary Alam reiterated his government's willingness to negotiate--although he did not retreat from the independence goal. Alam added that his government will send a delegation to New York for the beginning of the UN General Assembly.

The Soviets and the Indians appear to be co-ordinating their activities, and Prime Minister Gandhi has recently announced that she will travel to Moscow later this month for a three-day visit--possibly to assess Soviet reactions to recent [redacted]  
maneuvers. [redacted]

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BURMA: Rangoon's long-standing isolationism is still limiting its willingness to cooperate in international efforts at narcotics control.

The thrust of comments by Burmese officials in recent meetings in Rangoon with senior US officials concerned with narcotics matters was that Burma is determined to attack the problem of domestic opium production with a minimum of outside assistance or interference. Although the Burmese expressed willingness to exchange information with the US on trafficking and refining, they rejected any involvement in international action. Nor did the Burmese want attention focused on their narcotics problem in multinational organizations. They said that joint efforts with Thailand and Laos to eliminate trafficking in the triborder area would present political problems, particularly with the Thai. Rangoon's relations with Bangkok have been somewhat strained over Thai countenance of smuggling and of various resistance activities from Thailand, particularly those of former prime minister U Nu.

The Burmese admitted that their access to the area east of the Salween River, where much of Southeast Asia's opium is produced, is limited by long-standing insurgency. They argued, however, that the area's proximity to China ruled out any internationally sponsored aerial survey of poppy fields. Rangoon is obviously concerned over any activity that might arouse Chinese suspicions and mar the considerable improvement in Sino-Burmese relations that appears to have resulted from General Ne Win's visit to Peking last month.

Despite Burmese apprehensions about involvement in international control measures, their discussion with foreign officials has been considerably more forthcoming than their usual response. Their agreement to limited cooperation in the exchange of intelligence suggests that they may be amenable to future approaches.

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COMMUNIST CHINA: The military apparently is becoming deeply involved in the sensitive process of rebuilding the party apparatus in local administrative units.

In an unusually candid statement, an Anhwei provincial broadcast on 4 September asserted that since the spring of 1970 propaganda teams drawn from regular units "at the regimental level and above" had been sent to more than a third of the province's 70 counties to carry out ideological and organizational work. In one county, obviously meant to be representative of the province as a whole, all the party units at the township, commune, and production brigade level are said to have been "re-established before 1 July of this year." This is a clear admission that these roving military teams are directly involved in selecting and installing the leaders of individual party units at all levels in the rural areas. Moreover, the assertion that the teams had "ferreted out active counterrevolutionaries" on the local revolutionary committees set up during the Cultural Revolution strongly implies that the military has been given a free hand in purging militant factionalists and other political troublemakers.

Military representatives clearly dominate China's new provincial party committees, and recent broadcasts have suggested that military men may hold a larger proportion of key positions in the nascent county-level party committees than had previously been assumed. Even so, the extent to which regular troops are apparently being relied on to oversee the complex and time-consuming process of reconstructing the party at administrative units below the county level is remarkable. Given the regime's professed desire to reassert "party control," this kind of work might be expected to be entrusted to a greater extent to "rehabilitated" party veterans who of late are coming back to their old posts in increasing numbers and who are undoubtedly more familiar with local conditions.

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The Anhwei broadcast characterized the practice of sending down the army teams as "a new method" of improving the military's performance of the many onerous civil tasks it has inherited as a result of the Cultural Revolution. If this method is being adopted on a national scale, with extensive use of regular troops, it will almost certainly hamper Peking's recent efforts to bolster the army's combat preparedness. Other recent provincial broadcasts have also emphasized the long-term and complicated nature of the problems facing the army in its domestic political role, suggesting that the military will remain a highly visible element in the emerging post - Cultural Revolution party and government structure for an indefinite period.

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JAPAN-CHINA-UN: Japan's cosponsorship of US-proposed resolutions dealing with Chinese representation in the UN appears to be still under consideration. Following a meeting with Prime Minister Sato on 10 September, Justice Minister Maeo backed away from his earlier threat to resign if the government cosponsored dual representation for Peking and Taiwan. Maeo's public change of heart suggests that Sato may have greater support for cosponsorship within the government party than the adamant statements of some powerful faction leaders had indicated.

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FINLAND: President Kekkonen's proposal of 11 September to sign treaties with both German states includes a veto power for Bonn and is therefore unlikely to result in anything tangible. The Finns have, however, given a psychological and propaganda boost to the East German quest for international equality with West Germany. There is little available evidence to explain Kekkonen's motives, but the Finns may plan more actions of this sort as a part of their campaign to win Soviet approval for a future commercial agreement with the European Communities.

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
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CUBA-USSR: An agreement to collaborate in the mechanization of the Cuban sugar industry apparently was the only significant accomplishment of the first session of the Soviet-Cuban intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation. The commission, established in December 1970, is concerned with joint long-term planning, coordination, and operation of the Cuban economy. Press reporting on last week's meeting, however, suggests that the two sides were largely occupied with current problems, such as insufficient utilization of Soviet-trained Cuban technicians, the failure to fulfill contracts, and inefficient handling of Soviet ships in Cuban ports rather than with more basic economic matters. The Soviet team returned home last weekend. [redacted]

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